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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration

by Mary F. Radford*
This Article examines the major cases decided and legislation enacted
during the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003. The cases
and statutes discussed cover the substantive law relating to decedents'
estates, trusts, and guardianships, and to the fiduciaries who administer
these entities. The cases also explore procedural rules that apply in
litigation arising from the creation and ongoing administration of these
legal relationships.
I.

A.

RECENT CASES OF NOTE

Year's Support

Year's support is the financial protection offered by Georgia law to the
surviving spouse and minor children of a decedent.' The petitioner for
year's support asks to be awarded specified property from the decedent's

* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Newcomb College of
Tulane University (B.A., 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision
Committee, and Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Law Section of the State
Bar of Georgia. The author expresses her appreciation to Lawrence Dietrich and Jodi
Mount for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7 (1997). Year's support is available whether a decedent dies testate
or intestate. Id. Eligibility for an award of year's support is a matter of status; that is, the
surviving spouse or minor child is eligible to receive the award regardless of whether that
individual was in fact being supported by the decedent. However, the degree of
dependency on the decedent for support is a factor that may be determined in calculating
the amount necessary for the support. See Richards v. Wadsworth, 230 Ga. App. 421, 42324, 496 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1997). For a general discussion of the status and dependency
theories of year's support, see MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
IN GEORGIA § 10-1 (6th ed. 2000).
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estate,2 and if no objection is filed, the petitioner is awarded whatever
he requests in the petition.3 If an objection is filed, the probate judge
must determine and set aside as year's support "an amount sufficient to
maintain the standard of living that the surviving spouse and each
minor child had prior to the death of the decedent" 4 after considering
other available means of support, the solvency of the estate, and "[sluch
other ...criteria as the court deems equitable and proper."' In recent
years, the Georgia Court of Appeals has issued somewhat confusing
pronouncements as to what amount constitutes an appropriate award of
year's support. In Richards v. Wadsworth,6 the court of appeals upheld
the probate court's decision to reduce the amount awarded to a widower
by the jury, holding that the widower had ample resources of his own.7
The court of appeals pointed out that "[y]ear's support is not intended to
pay the surviving spouse for loss of the relationship or for personal
sacrifices made during the marriage."' In Driskell v. Crisler,s when
determining the appropriateness of an award of year's support, the court
of appeals looked not only to the couple's income in the year prior to the
death of the husband, but also to the standard of living the couple
enjoyed throughout their marriage and to the fact that the decedent's
illness had caused their standard of living to decline substantially in the
years prior to his death. 10 The financial and personal sacrifices made
by his wife were considered by the court of appeals in its determination
of the appropriateness of the award. 1
In 2002 in Hunter v.Hunter, 2 the court of appeals reversed the
probate court's grant of the marital home 3 to a seventy-four year old
widow.'" The court of appeals held that the grant of the home, valued
at over $91,000, bore no "reasonable relationship to the amount the

2. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-5(b) (Supp. 2002). The award of year's support takes precedence
over other debts of the estate, except certain secured debts. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-3-1(b), -16, -17,
-18 (1997).
3. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7(a) (2003).
4. Id. § 53-3-7(c).
5. Id. § 53-3-7(c)(3).
6. 230 Ga. App. 421, 496 S.E.2d 535 (1997).
7. Id. at 426, 496 S.E.2d at 539.
8. Id. at 425, 496 S.E.2d at 538.
9. 237 Ga. App. 408, 515 S.E.2d 416 (1999).
10. Id. at 410-12, 515 S.E.2d at 419-21.
11. Id. at 410-14, 515 S.E.2d at 419-22.
12. 256 Ga. App. 898, 569 S.E.2d 919 (2002).
13. The decedent's will left the widow a life estate in the home, with the remainder to
go to the decedent's sons from another marriage. The widow petitioned to have the entire
interest in the home granted to her as year's support. Id. at 898-900, 569 S.E.2d at 919-21.
14. Id. at 900, 569 S.E.2d at 921.
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surviving spouse need[ed] for a period of 12 months ...to maintain the
standard of living she had prior to the decedent's death."1 5 In this case,
the court of appeals refused to consider the personal sacrifices the widow
made during the marriage. 6 Instead, the court looked only to the
couple's style of living in the year prior to the decedent's death and to
whether the surviving spouse's needs increased in the year after the
In doing so, the court seemingly ignored its
decedent's death. 7
discussion in Driskell v. Crisler5 but reiterated its assertion in the
1997 case Richards v.Wadsworth. 9 In Richards the court ruled that
year's support is designed to support a surviving spouse rather than to
compensate him for sacrifices and contributions made during the
marriage. 21 In Hunter the court of appeals noted that the latter type
of claim was "in essence [a claim] for equitable division of the property,
[which] cannot be maintained apart from divorce proceedings." 2 '
B.

Wills
1. Probate of Wills in Common Form

In In re Lyons,2 2 the court of appeals added the finishing touch to its
evolving doctrine concerning the disallowance of appeals from proceed-

15. Id. at 898, 569 S.E.2d at 920.
16. Id. at 900, 569 S.E.2d at 921.
17. Id. at 899, 900, 569 S.E.2d at 920, 921. In Driskell the court of appeals had
previously expanded its assessment to include the style of living enjoyed by the couple
throughout the marriage. 237 Ga. App. at 410, 515 S.E.2d at 420. In Hunter the court
examined only the couple's income and needs in the year prior to the decedent's death, and
it held that these varied little from the widow's income and needs in the year after his
death. 256 Ga. App. at 899, 569 S.E.2d at 920. The Georgia year's support statute allows
a surviving spouse to wait up to twenty-four months following the decedent's death before
filing the petition. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-5(c). In Hunter the widow did not file her petition until
a year after her husband's death, so the court had a record of her income and expenses
during that year. 256 Ga. App. at 899, 569 S.E.2d at 920. The widow's evidence also
indicated that she would need to retire soon due to her age, thus cutting her income
appreciably, but the court of appeals noted that, even without that income, an award of the
house to her would have been excessive. Id. at 900, 569 S.E.2d at 921.
18. 237 Ga. App. at 410-14, 515 S.E.2d at 419-22; see supra text accompanying notes
9-11.
19. 230 Ga. App. at 425-26, 496 S.E.2d at 538-39; see supra text accompanying notes
6-8.
20. 230 Ga. App. at 425, 496 S.E.2d at 538; see also Hunter, 256 Ga. App. at 900, 569
S.E.2d at 921.
21. 256 Ga. App. at 900, 569 S.E.2d at 921.
22. 259 Ga. App. 563, 578 S.E.2d 241 (2003).
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ings to probate a will in common form.2 3 In 1994 in Freeman v.
Mobley,24 the court held that there can be no appeal from the probate
of a will in common form.25 In 1998 in Henderson v. McVay,26 the
court determined that no one has a right to file a caveat to a petition to
probate a will in common form. In Lyons the court held "there is no
right to appeal a probate court's decision" 21 to deny the probate of a
will in common form.
2. Will Construction
a. Lapse. In Bridges v. Taylor29 the Georgia Supreme Court construed a will that left the residue of the testator's estate to three
relatives in equal shares.3 ° The will also provided that if any of these
relatives should die before the testator, that person's share "[would]
lapse and ... augment proportionally the remaining shares."3 ' As fate
would have it, all three of the relatives predeceased the testator. The
surviving descendants of the last relative to die claimed that they should
take the residue by virtue of the application of Georgia's anti-lapse
statute. 32 The supreme court disagreed, noting that the anti-lapse
statute applies only if a gift in a will is "absolute and without remainder

23. Id. at 563, 578 S.E.2d at 241. In Georgia a will may be probated in common form
or in solemn form. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-15 (1997). Probate in common form requires no notice
to anyone, but it is not conclusive upon the parties in interest for four years from the date
the will is admitted to probate. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-16(a) (1997); O.C.G.A. § 53-5-17 (1997 &
Supp. 2003); O.C.G.A. § 53-5-19 (1997). Probate in solemn form requires notice to the heirs
of the testator and other parties in interest. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-22 (1997 & Supp. 2003).
Although the notice takes time, once the will is admitted to probate in solemn form, it is
immediately conclusive upon the parties in interest. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-20 (1997).
24. 213 Ga. App. 240, 444 S.E.2d 155 (1994).
25. Id. at 241, 444 S.E.2d at 156.
26. 269 Ga. 7, 494 S.E.2d 653 (1998).
27. Id. at 8, 494 S.E.2d at 655. A "caveat" is a contest to the validity of a will. See
RADFORD, supra note 1, § 6-16. A person who desires to challenge a petition to probate a
will in common form should petition the probate judge to cite the propounder of the will
to probate it in solemn form and then file a caveat to that petition. Id. § 6-8.
28. 259 Ga. App. at 563, 578 S.E.2d at 241. The probate judge dismissed the petitions
to probate two wills in common form because she noticed discrepancies in the facts
presented in the petitions from earlier petitions that had been filed to probate the wills in
solemn form. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 241-42.
29. 276 Ga. 530, 579 S.E.2d 740 (2003).
30. Id. at 530, 579 S.E.2d at 741.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 530-31, 579 S.E.2d at 741. O.C.G.A. section 53-4-64, the "anti-lapse statute,"
provides that, in certain cases, if a beneficiary who is named in the will dies before the
testator, the testamentary gift to that beneficiary shall pass to the living descendants of
the beneficiary. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-64(a) (1997).
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or limitation."33 The court noted that the plain language of the will
was conditional and expressly called for a lapse to occur if any beneficiary failed to survive the testator.3 4 Consequently, the court held that
the gift of the residue had lapsed, and thus, the residuary estate should
pass to the testator's intestate heirs.35
b. In Terrorem Clause. An in terrorem ("no contest") clause is a
clause in a will by which the testator voids a testamentary gift to any
beneficiary who attacks the validity of the will or any of its provisions.3" Although recognized by Georgia law, in terrorem clauses are
This strict method of construction3
strictly construed by the courts.
was applied by the Georgia Supreme Court in Preuss v. Stokes-Preuss. 8
The clause in Preuss called for the forfeiture of the interest of any
"beneficiary" who contested the will. 39 One of the beneficiaries under
the will was also a coexecutor who wished to bring an action to remove
the other coexecutor. Prior to doing so, the beneficiary/coexecutor filed
a declaratory judgment action to determine whether bringing the action
against the coexecutor would cause her to forfeit her beneficial interest
under the will.4 ° The supreme court affirmed the probate court's
finding that the clause applied only when a "beneficiary" brought an
action,41 and, as the coexecutor was bringing the action in her fiduciary
capacity for the sole purpose of removing the other42 coexecutor, the in
terrorem clause did not apply to forfeit her interest.

33. 276 Ga. at 531 n.1, 579 S.E.2d at 741 n.1 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-4-64(a)).
34. Id. at 531, 579 S.E.2d at 741-42.
35. Id. If a residuary gift lapses and the anti-lapse statute is not applicable, Georgia
law requires that residuary gift to be shared proportionally among the other residuary
beneficiaries. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-65(b) (1997). However, if there are no other surviving
beneficiaries, the gift of the residue passes by intestacy to the heirs of the testator. Id.
36. For a discussion of no contest clauses see RADFORD, supra note 1, § 8-7.
37. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-68(b) (1997). These clauses are accepted by Georgia law, provided
that the will includes an alternative disposition of the testamentary gift if the clause is
violated. Id. Because in terrorem clauses result in a forfeiture, they are not generally
favored by the courts and are strictly construed. Linkous v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta,
247 Ga. 274, 274 S.E.2d 469 (1981).
38. 275 Ga. 437, 569 S.E.2d 857 (2002).
39. Id. at 437, 569 S.E.2d at 857.
40. Id. at 437-38, 569 S.E.2d at 857-58.
41. Id. at 438, 569 S.E.2d at 858.
42. Id.
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3. Will Contests
During the 2001-2002 reporting period, in three separate will contest
cases, the Georgia Supreme Court discussed the ramifications on an
undue influence claim 43 when the testator and the alleged "influencer"
are in a confidential relationship. 44 In these cases, the supreme court
called into question whether the sheer existence of a confidential
relationship is enough to raise the presumption that undue influence
was exerted, or whether the individual accused of exerting the influence
must also have played an active role in procuring the execution of the
will. 45
In the two will contest cases decided during the 2002-2003
reporting period, Duncan v. Moore4' and Ashford v. Van Home,47 the
court made only a passing reference to this issue and shed no further
light on the debate. Both cases were decided in favor of the propounders
of the wills and against those who alleged undue influence.48
In
Duncan49 the caveators alleged that the principal beneficiary under the
will and the testator were in a confidential relationship and the
"presumption of undue influence that accompanies" such a relationship

43. The validity of a will can be destroyed by "undue influence whereby the will of
another is substituted for the wishes of the testator." O.C.G.A. § 53-4-12 (1997).
44. The three cases were Harperv. Harper, 274 Ga. 542, 554 S.E.2d 454 (2001), White
v. Regions Bank, 275 Ga. 38, 561 S.E.2d 806 (2002), and Jones v. Sperau, 275 Ga. 213, 563
S.E.2d 863 (2002) discussed in Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, and Administration of
Estates, 54 MERCER L. REV. 583, 588-93 (2002).
A relationship:
shall be deemed confidential, whether arising from nature, created by law, or
resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling
influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar
relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as
the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc.
O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 (1982). The O.C.G.A. also provides as follows:
Where, by the act or consent of parties or the act of a third person or of the law,
one person is placed in such relation to another that he becomes interested for him
or with him in any subject or property, he is prohibited from acquiring rights in
that subject or property which are antagonistic to the person with whose interest
he has become associated.
O.C.G.A. § 23-2-59 (1982).
45. See Radford, supra note 44, at 588-93.
46. 275 Ga. 656, 571 S.E.2d 771 (2002).
47. 276 Ga. 636, 580 S.E.2d 201 (2003).
48. Duncan, 275 Ga. at 656, 571 S.E.2d at 771; Ashford, 276 Ga. at 636, 580 S.E.2d at
201.
49. In this case, the testator left her home and the surrounding land to a couple who
were not related to her but who had taken care of her. Her nearest surviving relatives
(nieces and nephews) caveated the will. 275 Ga. at 656, 571 S.E.2d at 772.
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had not been rebutted.5" The supreme court cited a few cases that
defined confidential relationships and undue influence, 1 but then
concluded that the finding of undue influence was one for the fact-finder
and evidence that 2the testator was a strong-willed woman who was
"sharp as a tack" supported the jury's verdict against the caveators.55 In Ashford the individual accused of exerting undue influence
drove the testator to his attorney's office for his first consultation
concerning his will. 4 However, without mentioning the concept of
confidential relationship, the court pointed out the propounder had
neither actually been present with the testator in the lawyer's office nor
otherwise participated in the will's execution.55
C. Personal Representatives
Two cases decided during the reporting period explore the circumstances under which an executor, exercising discretionary powers spelled
out in the will, may violate the rule against engaging in conflicts of
interest. In Harp v. Pryor,5 6 one of the testator's three sons was
appointed the executor of her estate. The principal assets of the estate
were cash and shares of stock in a family company. The residuary
beneficiaries of the estate were the three sons, who were to take the
residue in equal shares. The will granted the executor the power to
make distributions of the estate in cash or in kind, and all in-kind
distributions were to be made at the discretion of the executor. The son,
who was the executor, knew that if he made equal distributions of the
shares of stock, one of his brothers, who already owned a substantial
number of shares, would become the controlling shareholder of the
company. Consequently, the son petitioned the probate court for
permission to make unequal distributions of the shares (resulting in
equal ownership of the company by the three brothers) and to make up
for the unequal distribution of stock by distributing cash to the brother
who already owned a substantial number of shares. The probate court
found that such an action on the part of the executor would be proper

50. Id. at 657, 571 S.E.2d at 773.
51. Id. at 658, 571 S.E.2d at 773-74.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 276 Ga. at 636,580 S.E.2d at 201. The caveator in this case was the estranged wife
of the testator. The propounder of the will was the testator's sister. The supreme court
affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the propounder, noting that there was
nothing unreasonable about a testator who was facing a divorce excluding his wife from his
will. Id. at 638, 580 S.E.2d at 204.
55. Id. at 638, 580 S.E.2d at 204.
56. 276 Ga. 478, 578 S.E.2d 424 (2003).
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because the wording of the will was unambiguous, and the distribution
would not violate any term of the will.57 The supreme court reversed,
holding that the "peculiar facts" of this situation indicated a conflict of
interest on the part of the executor.5" The court pointed out that an
executor's discretion is "not unfettered" and that an executor is bound by
the general duty of fiduciaries to avoid conflicts of interest.59 The
dissenting justices"° argued that the majority's holding amounted to a
rewriting by the court of an unambiguous will and pointed out that the
testator easily could have provided in her will for an equal distribution
of the stock if that was what she wanted to occur. 61
The second conflict of interest case also involved siblings suing
siblings. In Bloodworth v.Bloodworth,6 2 two siblings were named as
coexecutors under their mother's will. The estate included real property,
and a codicil to the will provided that the property should be appraised
and sold with the net proceeds to be divided among the children." The
codicil included the following provision: "The sales price, time of sale,
method of sale, and all other decisions concerning the sale, shall be in
the absolute discretion of my Co-Executors."'
The coexecutors
apparently believed that this clause granted them unfettered discretion
because, at a family meeting, they told the other siblings that this meant
they "could do whatever they wanted to do.""5 The coexecutors ignored
one brother's bid to buy the property (made at a value close to the value
later assigned by the board of tax assessors) and, without his knowledge,
sold the property to another brother at appreciably below market
value.6 ' The trial court found the coexecutors' actions to be appropriate

57. Id. at 478, 578 S.E.2d at 425.
58. Id. at 479, 578 S.E.2d at 425.
59. Id. at 478, 578 S.E.2d at 425. The court looked to O.C.G.A. section 53-7-1(a) and
stated that "[t]he applicable statute does not declare the executor to be a fiduciary, but the
executor is bound by the 'rules generally applicable to fiduciaries to act in the best
interests of all persons who are interested in the estate and with due regard for their
respective rights.'" Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-7-1(a) (Supp. 2002)). The court in fact was
quoting the last sentence in subsection (a) of this statute, but failed to note that the fourth
sentence of the same subsection states expressly that "[a] personal representative is a
fiduciary." O.C.G.A. § 53-7-1(a) (2003).
60. Justices Sears, Hunstein, and Carley joined in the dissenting opinion. 276 Ga. at
479, 578 S.E.2d at 425-26 (Carley, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. 260 Ga. App. 466, 579 S.E.2d 858 (2003).
63. Id. at 470, 579 S.E.2d at 861.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 467, 579 S.E.2d at 859.
66. Id. at 467-68, 579 S.E.2d at 859-60. The first brother bid approximately $429,000
for the property. An appraisal made at about the same time valued the property at
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and granted summary judgment in their favor.17 The court of appeals
reversed, pointing out that the acts of coexecutors "are not beyond the
reach of judicial inquiry"6 8 and
that their overwhelming duty was to act
6 9
in the "'utmost good faith.'"
D.

Settlement Agreements

It is only in recent years that the use of alternative forms of dispute
resolution, 0 particularly mediation, 7' have become common in probate
and estate matters.72 Mediations and other settlement negotiations

$525,500. A month after the sale, the board of tax appraisers valued the land at $476,300.
The second brother actually bought the land for $315,000. Id. at 467-69, 578 S.E.2d at 85960. The first brother's lawyer entered into an agreement that no action would be taken on
the sale of the property for at least a week, but the coexecutors immediately sold the
property during that week to the second brother without notifying the first brother. Id. at
468-69, 578 S.E.2d at 860-61.
67. Id. at 466, 578 S.E.2d at 859.
68. Id. at 471, 578 S.E.2d at 861.
69. Id. (quoting Liner v. North, 188 Ga. App. 677, 678, 373 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1988)).
70. The term "alternative dispute resolution" is defined as follows:
Catchall generic term referring to ways in which a society with a formal, statesponsored [adjudicative process] attempts to resolve disputes without using that
process. It is a class of [dispute resolution] mechanisms and is commonly
understood to include alternatives to the formal adversary method of trial or
[litigation], as that process is understood in Western, particularly [common law],
systems.
Thus it includes [negotiation, mediation, arbitration,] and their
variations.
DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 17 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., Jossey-Bass Books 1999).
The "alternative dispute resolution movement" emerged in the United States in the 1960s.
Id. at 20. See also Bridget Genteman Hoy, The Draft Uniform MediationAct in Context:
Can it Clear Up the Clutter?, 44 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1121, 1126 (2000). Court sponsored
mediation programs began to proliferate in the mid-1970s. Id. at 1127.
71. For purposes of this Article, the term "mediation" will be defined as follows:
Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party-a mediator-facilitates
the resolution of a dispute by promoting voluntary agreement (or "self-determination") by the parties to the dispute. A mediator facilitates communications,
promotes understanding, focuses the parties on their interests, and seeks creative
problem solving to enable the parties to reach their own agreement.
This definition is the one used in the Model Standardsof Conduct for Mediatorsdeveloped
in 1992-1994 by a joint committee of the American Arbitration Association, American Bar
Association, and Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, availableat http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/dispute/modstan.txt.
72. As recently as six years ago, one commentator noted that the use of mediation in
probate and guardianship cases was "in its infancy." Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the
Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve ProbateDisputes over Guardianshipand Inheritance,
32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 434 (1997). See also Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to
the Uses of Mediation and Other Forms of Dispute Resolution in Probate, Trust, and
GuardianshipMatters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000). Yet, more recently,
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often result in binding settlement agreements entered into by the
parties. Four cases handed down during the reporting period were
appeals challenging the enforceability of such agreements.7 3
The most significant of these cases is Leone Hall Price Foundation v.
74
Baker.
In this case, the supreme court invoked wills law, trust law,
and contract law in holding that trustees of a charitable testamentary
trust, which would have dissolved as a result of a settlement agreement,
were "beneficiaries" who would be affected by the agreement and thus
were necessary parties to the agreement.75 The testator executed a will
and a trust agreement shortly before she died. The will directed the
bulk of her estate to the trust. The trust established the Leone Hall
Price Foundation ("the Foundation"), whose general purpose was to fund
activities related to education, historic preservation, and environmental
projects in seven named Georgia counties. The attorney who drafted the
documents was named as cotrustee of the trust (along with his spouse)
and executor under the will. Some of the testator's heirs caveated the
will, and the probate court ordered the parties to try to settle the case.
The attorney general and the state revenue commissioner represented
the ultimate beneficiaries of the charitable trust in the settlement
negotiations and consented to the settlement agreement.76 Under the
agreement the Foundation would be dissolved and the funds disbursed
to fund projects in one of the counties. The parties to the settlement
sought to have the settlement approved by the probate court as allowed

courts and practitioners have begun to recognize the value of alternative dispute resolution,
particularly mediation, in resolving estate disputes. See Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the
Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute Resolution, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 164
n. 13 (2002), in which Professor Madoff notes that court sponsored mediation programs have
been established in courts in Georgia, Washington, and Texas, among other jurisdictions.
73. The settlement agreements in these cases either arose or were invoked in the
context of litigation on estate matters. In addition to Leone Hall Price Foundation v.
Baker, 276 Ga. 318, 517 S.E.2d 779 (2003), discussed at infra text accompanying notes 7484, the other three cases are: Guthrie v. Guthrie, 259 Ga. App. 751, 577 S.E.2d 832 (2003)
(discussing the enforceability of a settlement agreement made in the course of divorce
proceedings); Griffin v. Wallace, 260 Ga. App. 857, 581 S.E.2d 375 (2003) (discussing
whether an offer made during a mediation session remained open and could still be
accepted after the session concluded); and Adcock v. Adcock, 259 Ga. App. 514, 577 S.E.2d
842 (2003) (discussing whether a settlement agreement entered into while a couple was
separated was enforceable after the wife moved back in with and lived with the husband
in the month before his death).
74. 276 Ga. 318, 577 S.E.2d 779 (2003).
75. Id. at 319-20, 577 S.E.2d at 781-82.
76. Id. at 318, 577 S.E.2d at 781. O.C.G.A. section 53-12-115 provides that the attorney
general or the county district attorney "in which the major portion of [the] trust ... lies"
are to represent the interests of the beneficiaries of charitable trusts. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-115
(1997).
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by Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 53-5-25.77
The trustees objected to the settlement agreement, but the probate court
approved the agreement over their objection. The trustees appealed,
contending that O.C.G.A. section 53-5-25(b) requires the consent of all
"beneficiaries" to a will for the court to approve a settlement agreement
and that the Foundation was in fact a "beneficiary" whose consent was
required.78 The probate court found that the trustees did not have a
true "beneficial interest" in the trust property and thus their consent
was not required. 79 The supreme court held that the trustees were
"beneficiaries" as contemplated by O.C.G.A. section 53-5-25(b) because
the Foundation was "affected" by the settlement agreement, and the
trustees were bound by their fiduciary duty to defend the trust as a
separate legal entity that had been established in accordance with the
settlor's express intent."0 The court, noting that compliance with the
settlement statute was not mandatory,8 1 also examined trust law and
contract law to determine whether the trustees' consent was required. 2
Basic trust law indicates that a trust cannot be terminated, even if all
of the beneficiaries consent, if the termination is not in accord with the
settlor's intent.8 3 Under basic contract law, the court held that the
trustees were required to be parties to any agreement that purported to
bind them.'
E.

Miscellaneous FiduciaryLitigation Issues

Five cases in the reporting period were appealed on procedural, rather
than substantive, grounds. This subsection includes a brief synopsis of
the procedural "lessons" that fiduciary lawyers can take from the
decisions in these cases.

77. 276 Ga. at 320, 577 S.E.2d at 782. O.C.G.A. section 53-5-25 allows, but does not
require, parties to a settlement to have that settlement approved by the court. The statute
authorizes "[aill individuals who are suijuris and affected by such a settlement agreement
...to enter into such an agreement" and requires the agreement to be signed by "all the
heirs of the testator and ... [the] beneficiaries [who are] affected by such settlement."
O.C.G.A. § 53-5-25(b) (1997).
78. 276 Ga. at 318-19, 577 S.E.2d at 781.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 319, 577 S.E.2d at 781-82.
81. Id. at 320, 577 S.E.2d at 782.
82. Id. at 319, 577 S.E.2d at 781.
83. Id. at 319-20, 577 S.E.2d at 781-82.
84. Id. at 320, 577 S.E.2d at 782.
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1. Lesson 1-File on Time
In two cases the question at issue was whether the appeals had
8 5 although neither party
been timely filed. In In re Estate of Dasher,
raised the issue on appeal, the court of appeals determined that the
notice of appeal was not timely filed.16 O.C.G.A. section 5-6-38(a)
requires appeals to be filed within thirty days of the date of the decision
being appealed.87 The executor's appeal was filed thirty-three days
after the date of the probate court's order. The thirtieth day after the
decision was rendered was Good Friday, which was then followed by the
weekend."8 O.C.G.A. section 1-3-1(d)(3) allows a filing to be deferred to
the next business day if the prescribed date for filing falls on a "public
and legal holiday."8 9 Good Friday was declared a county holiday by
Cobb County.90 The court of appeals noted that even when a courthouse is closed, provision is often made for an alternative means of filing
documents. 91 The record did not reveal whether the executor had even
tried to file the notice on Good Friday or had just assumed that the
courthouse would be closed and he would be unable to file.92 The court
of appeals also noted that a party may request an extension of time to
file a notice of appeal under O.C.G.A. section 5-6-39(a)(1).9 3 There was
no evidence that the executor requested an extension. The court of
appeals held that it was not "free to disregard" the untimeliness of the
filing and described several cases with far more compelling circumstances in which the time period had nevertheless been stringently applied. 94

85. 259 Ga. App. 201, 576 S.E.2d 559 (2002). In this case, an attorney who was the
nephew of the decedent's widow was appointed executor of the decedent's estate. Pursuant
to an action brought by the decedent's children from a prior marriage, the executor was
ordered by the Cobb County Probate Court to pay back money erroneously distributed to
him as commissions and to restore certain items that were missing from the estate. The
executor appealed to the court of appeals. Id. at 201, 576 S.E.2d at 560.
86. Id. at 206, 576 S.E.2d at 562-63.
87. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a) (1995).
88. 259 Ga. App. at 202-03, 576 S.E.2d at 560-61.
89. O.C.G.A. section 1-4-1 (1997) lists the "public and legal holidays," but does not
include Good Friday. In fact, O.C.G.A. section 1-4-2 (1997) limits religious holidays to
Sundays.
90. 259 Ga. App. at 203, 576 S.E.2d at 560.
91. Id., 576 S.E.2d at 561.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 203-04, 576 S.E.2d at 561; see O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39(a)(1) (1995).
94. 259 Ga. App. at 204, 576 S.E.2d at 561-62.
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In Wilson v. Hinely,95 the father of the decedent filed a complaint for
abusive litigation against the alleged common law husband of the
decedent, who had sought to be appointed the administrator of her
estate. 6 However, the court of appeals confirmed the trial court's
finding that the complaint was not timely filed because it was filed one
day later than the expiration of the one year statute of limitations.9 7
The father argued that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
98
until the court of appeals issued the remittitur following its decision.
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the "final termination" of
the proceedings (referenced in the abusive litigation statute, O.C.G.A.
section 51-7-84) occurred when the court of appeals issued its unchallenged opinion affirming the order of the probate court. 99
2. Lesson 2-Don't Attempt to Expand a Hearing Beyond the
Scope of the Notice Given
In In re Estate of Zeigler,100 a beneficiary under Ms. Zeigler's will
filed a petition requesting the probate court to order the executor to
provide her with information about certain property of the estate. 10 1
The probate court issued a rule nisi order instructing the executor to
appear to show cause why "the relief prayed for should not be granted.""0 2 The executor did not appear at the hearing, although her
attorney did appear on her behalf. The probate court removed the

95. 259 Ga. App. 615, 578 S.E.2d 254 (2003).
96. Id. at 615, 578 S.E.2d at 255. The decedent was survived by her father and a man
who claimed to be her common law husband. The alleged husband petitioned to be
appointed administrator, but the probate court denied his petition on the ground that no
common law marriage existed. He appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the denial.
Id.
97. Id. at 616, 578 S.E.2d at 256. O.C.G.A. section 51-7-84(b) provides as follows: "An
action or claim under this article requires the final termination of the proceeding in which
the alleged abusive litigation occurred and must be brought within one year of the date of
final termination." O.C.G.A. § 53-7-84(b) (1997). The court of appeals decision on the
appointment of the administrator was issued on February 17, 1999, and no petition for
reconsideration or for certiorari was filed. On February 18, 2000, the father filed a
complaint for abusive litigation against the alleged husband. Summary judgment was
granted on the ground that the complaint was fied later than the one-year statute of
limitations. 259 Ga. App. at 615, 578 S.E.2d at 255.
98. 259 Ga. App. at 615, 578 S.E.2d at 255.
99. Id. at 616, 578 S.E.2d at 255.
100. 259 Ga. App. 807, 578 S.E.2d 519 (2003).
101. Id. at 807, 578 S.E.2d at 520.
102. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 521.
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executor for failure to appear, and the executor appealed." 3 The court
of appeals held the removal improper because the executor had not
14
received proper notice that the revocation of her letters was at issue.'
3. Lesson 3-Remember the Limits on Punitive Damages
The case of Sims v. Heath °5 concerned a sister's lawsuit against her
two brothers for breach of fiduciary duty in their administration of the
estate of the children's father. The jury awarded compensatory damages
(around $1 million) and punitive damages ($404,633) to the sister, and
the brothers were removed as executors of the estate. 106 The court of
appeals examined some thirteen alleged procedural errors on appeal.' 7
Although the court of appeals decided most of these claims in favor of
the sister, 08 the court did reduce the punitive damages award to
$250,000.109 In reviewing an award for punitive damages, the appellate court must determine whether the award is grossly excessive on due
process grounds and whether it is within the bounds set forth by Georgia
statutory law. 110 The court of appeals held that the award was not
grossly excessive,"' but determined that the award in question fell

103. Id. at 808, 578 S.E.2d at 521. At the same time that the executor appealed, the
probate court vacated its order and issued a second rule nisi order, this time ordering the
executor to appear to show cause as to why her letters testamentary should not be revoked.
The executor again did not appear, but her attorney did appear on her behalf. The probate
court removed her and appointed a new executor. The court of appeals dealt only with the
first probate court order because it noted that the appeal of that order had acted as a
supersedeas, thus preventing the probate court from vacating its order and from all of its
subsequent actions. Id.
104. Id. at 809, 578 S.E.2d at 522. The court of appeals noted that the executor had
failed to respond to numerous requests for information made by the beneficiary and that
such failure could constitute "good cause" for removal (as required by O.C.G.A. section 53-755(1)). Id. However, the lack of notice to the executor caused the court of appeals to
reverse the case and remand it to the probate court. Id.
105. 258 Ga. App. 681, 577 S.E.2d 789 (2002).
106. Id. at 681, 577 S.E.2d at 791.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 688 n.26, 577 S.E.2d at 795 n.26 (citing Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six
Flags Over Ga., LLC, 254 Ga. App. 598, 563 S.E.2d 178 (2002)).
111. Id. at 688, 577 S.E.2d at 795. The court noted that "the compensatory damages
exceeded the punitive damages by a ratio of over two to one, and sanctions for comparable
misconduct are sufficiently similar to satisfy due process." Id.

2003]

WILLS AND TRUSTS

473

within the confines of O.C.G.A. section 51-12-5.1(g), which limits the
award of punitive damages in most tort actions to $250,000.112
4. Lesson 4-Service that Meets the Statutory Requirements
Constitutes Proper Service Regardless of Whether it is Actually
Received
Adams v. Adams"3 was another family dispute in which one sibling,
as personal representative of his mother's estate, sued his brother
Thomas, and Thomas's wife Joann, to recover a house that he claimed
they had inappropriately obtained from the mother when she was
suffering from Alzheimer's related dementia. Thomas and his wife were
represented by the same attorney. Thomas was personally served at his
home, and a copy of the complaint and summons was also left for
Joann.u 4 Georgia law allows service to be accomplished "by leaving
copies [of the complaint and summons] at [the defendant's] dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein."1 5 Joann never responded to the
summons. It was later discovered that she and Thomas had been
estranged and both had been living in the home but in a state of
separation. Also, at some point, Thomas informed the executor that he
would settle with him and assist him in the litigation against Joann.
Joann claimed first that she had not been validly served with process." 6 The court of appeals held that the service had been made in
accordance with the statutory process and that it was immaterial that
the two had become hostile towards each other and estranged.'1 7
Joann also disputed that she had been validly served with discovery
requests (to which she had never responded) because they were put in
the same envelope and addressed to both Thomas and Joann."5l The
court of appeals again held that the requests were properly served." 9

112. Id. Subsections (f) and (g) of O.C.G.A. section 51-12-5.1 (2000) limit the award of
punitive damages in cases that do not involve product liability to $250,000 unless it can
be shown that the defendant acted with "the specific intent to cause harm." The court of
appeals did not find such intent in the actions of the two brothers. Id. at 688, 577 S.E.2d
at 795-96.
113. 260 Ga. App. 597, 580 S.E.2d 261 (2003).
114. Id. at 598, 580 S.E.2d at 263.
115. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(7) (1997 & Supp. 2002).
116. 260 Ga. App. at 600, 580 S.E.2d at 265.
117. Id. at 600-01, 580 S.E.2d at 265.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 601-02, 580 S.E.2d at 265.
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TRusts

In the two cases involving trusts that were decided during the
reporting period, the predominant question was whether the statute of
limitations for filing actions against the trustee had run. The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of trust claim depends upon when
the claim arises. For claims that arise on or after July 1, 1991, the
action must be brought within six years of the date the beneficiary
received a written report that adequately disclosed that a claim existed
or, if there is no report, within six years of the date the beneficiary
discovered or reasonably should have discovered the subject of the
claim.12 ° If the claim arose prior to July 1, 1991, the applicable date
on which the claim is barred by the statute of limitations is the earlier
of ten years from the date the cause of action accrued, or six years from
July 1, 1991.121

In Snuggs v. Snuggs, 2 2 both statutes of limitations were used
because some of the trustee's activities that were arguably a breach of
trust occurred before July 1, 1991, and others occurred after that
date."
The case involved an "oral, implied trust" 124 for the "advanced educations" of the settlors' grandchildren. 125 The trustees were
the parents of plaintiff and other grandchildren of the settlors.
Plaintiff's action was dismissed because the trial court found he had not
filed it within the time prescribed by the appropriate statute of
limitations. 26 The supreme court reversed the trial court's judgment
and remanded the case. 127 The court examined three incidents in the
life of the trust to determine the date on which the statute of limitations

120. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-198(a) (1997). The statute provides in part as follows:
A report adequately discloses existence of a claim if it provides sufficient
information so that the beneficiary knows of the claim or reasonably should have
inquired into the existence of the claim. If the beneficiary has not received a report
which adequately discloses the existence of a claim against the trustee for breach
of trust, the claim is barred as to that beneficiary unless a proceeding to assert the
claim is commenced within six years after the beneficiary discovered, or
reasonably should have discovered, the subject of the claim.
Id.
121. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-27 (1993 & Supp. 2002); O.C.G.A. § 53-12-198(d) (1997).
122. 275 Ga. 647, 571 S.E.2d 800 (2002).
123. Id. at 647, 571 S.E.2d at 800.
124. Id. The existence of such a trust is questionable because Georgia law requires all
express trusts to be in writing. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20 (1997). However, neither of the
parties in the case seemed to raise this issue. 275 Ga. at 647, 571 S.E.2d at 801.
125. 275 Ga. at 647, 571 S.E.2d at 801.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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began to run. 28 In the first incident, which occurred in 1986, plaintiff's parents denied his request for funds for his undergraduate
education. 129 The court held that this denial was not a violation of the
trust because the trust had not been established to fund the undergraduate educations of the grandchildren.130 The second incident was a
request by the son in 1991 for an accounting and disbursement from the
trust. At that time, the parents explained to him that he was the owner
of twenty-five percent of the trust, but all assets were to remain in the
trust until the last beneficiary finished his advanced education. Also at
this time, the parents truthfully claimed that they were not using the
trust for their personal expenses. 13 ' The court determined consequently that a cause of action did not arise at this point because there was
still no breach of the trustees' fiduciary duty. 32 The third incident
occurred in 1997, when plaintiff's mother declared that she intended to
use the trust assets for her own benefit and in fact did so.

33

At this

point the court found that a breach had occurred and that plaintiff had
34
timely filed his action on that violation of the trust.
In Goldston v. Bank of America Corp.,135 the court of appeals

reversed the trial court's decision to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint as
time-barred. 36 The statute of limitations at issue in this case was a
ten-year statute of limitations. 37 The trustee was a predecessor of the
Bank of America ("the Bank"). The trust had been set up by a father in
conjunction with his divorce from the beneficiaries' mother. The major
asset of the trust was undeveloped land in Atlanta, Georgia. 13' The
father/settlor expressed his desire that the property be held, if possible,
until it "ha[d] reached maximum enhancement in value. " 139 One half
of the trust property was to be distributed to each child when that child
reached age twenty-one. The trust required the trustee to make full
annual reports to the children and to honor a child's request for full
information as to the condition of the trust estate.' 4° For purposes of

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 648-49, 571 S.E.2d at 801-02.
Id. at 648, 571 S.E.2d at 802.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 801-02.
Id. at 649, 571 S.E.2d at 802.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 801-02.
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 802.
Id.
259 Ga. App. 690, 577 S.E.2d 864 (2003).
Id. at 690, 577 S.E.2d at 866.
See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
259 Ga. App. at 690, 577 S.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 691-92, 577 S.E.2d at 867.
Id. at 691, 577 S.E.2d at 867.
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the motion to dismiss, the Bank conceded as "true" allegations that the
Bank had never disbursed the assets to anyone for the children's support
nor had it made annual reports or turned over to each child that child's
one half interest when the child reached age twenty-one.''
The
beneficiaries did not even discover that the trust existed until their
mother was found to be incapacitated and one of them took over her
financial affairs. Five years after discovering the existence of the trust,
one of the children filed a suit for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.
The Bank argued, and the trial court agreed, that the suit was time
barred because the last breach of fiduciary duty occurred in 1970, when
the Bank failed to distribute the trust assets after the second child
reached age twenty-one."'
The court, however, agreed with the
beneficiaries that the statute of limitations was tolled by the fraud
engaged in by the Bank when it failed to disclose the
143 existence of the
trust and failed to comply with any of its provisions.
G. Guardianships
In Cross v. Stokes,1" the Georgia Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality and applicability of a Georgia statute that applies
exclusively to guardianships that are instigated by the Department of
Veterans Affairs. 145 Title 29 of the O.C.G.A. contains a chapter
devoted to guardians of "mentally incompetent wards" 14 and minors
who are due moneys from the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs. 147 These guardianships are governed by the provisions of the
Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act, which is incorporated in Chapter
6 of Title 29.1' The statute at issue in this case, O.C.G.A. section 296-11(c), provides as follows:
Unless a guardian under this chapter is the next of kin under the laws
of descent and distribution of the State of Georgia, no such guardian
shall be named as a beneficiary under the last will and testament of
141. Id. at 694, 577 S.E.2d at 869. Undisputed evidence also indicated that the Bank
had in fact sold the land back to the father (through his second wife) less than two years
after the trust was created. The Bank had held the proceeds in trust. Id. at 692, 577
S.E.2d at 867.
142. Id. at 692-93, 696, 577 S.E.2d at 868, 870.
143. Id. at 696, 577 S.E.2d at 870. The court of appeals noted that "[the sun never
sets on fraud." Id. at 693, 577 S.E.2d at 868.
144. 275 Ga. 872, 572 S.E.2d 538 (2002).
145. Id. at 872, 572 S.E.2d at 538.
146. A "mentally incompetent ward" is an adult who has been rated as "incompetent"
by the Department of Veterans Affairs. O.C.G.A. §§ 29-6-1, -3 (2001).
147. O.C.G.A. §§ 29-6-1 to 29-6-18 (2003).
148. See id.
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his or her ward under any will executed while the guardian is serving
as such. 1Any
provision in any such will to the contrary shall be null
49
and void.
The testator in Cross had a will that bequeathed one half of his estate
to his cousin and one half to Cross, the family attorney, who also was
serving as the testator's guardian at the time he wrote his will. The
testator had originally been declared incompetent by the Department of
Veterans Affairs in 1952, and his father was appointed his guardian. 5 °
When his father died, his mother was appointed as his guardian. When
his mother died, the family attorney was appointed guardian.15 ' When
the testator died, "the probate court, citing 'somewhat unusual'
circumstances, ,,112 appointed a guardian ad litem for unknown
heirs. 5 3 The guardian ad litem brought to the court's attention the
provisions of O.C.G.A. section 29-6-11(c). The other beneficiary under
the will petitioned to serve as administrator with the will annexed, and
the probate court granted her petition on the condition that she file a
petition for declaratory judgment to determine the effect of that statute
The attorney filed his own petition for
on the will's provisions.
declaratory judgment, claiming the statute was unconstitutional. The
probate court found the statute to be constitutional and held that it
applied to preclude the attorney from taking any of the testator's
54
estate.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the probate
court. 5
The court first determined that the appeal was timely
filed 5 and then examined whether the probate court had jurisdiction
to issue a declaratory judgment in the case.' 57 Citing O.C.G.A. section
9-2-4 (which gives the superior courts the right to issue declaratory judgments) and O.C.G.A. section 15-9-127 (which gives certain probate courts
concurrent jurisdiction with the superior courts in proceedings for
declaratory judgment regarding fiduciaries), the court concluded that the
probate court had properly exercised declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 5 " Next, after a brief discussion of the history of the guardianship, the court dismissed the attorney's technical argument that he was

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

O.C.G.A. § 29-6-11(c) (2003).
275 Ga. at 872, 876, 572 S.E.2d at 540-41, 543.
Id. at 876, 572 S.E.2d at 543.
Id. at 872, 572 S.E.2d at 541.
Id.
Id. at 872-73, 572 S.E.2d at 541.
Id. at 878, 572 S.E.2d at 544-45.
Id. at 874, 572 S.E.2d at 542.
Id. at 874-75, 572 S.E.2d at 542.
Id. at 875, 572 S.E.2d at 542.
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not serving as a Veterans Affairs ("VA") guardian.1 5 9
Then, the
Georgia Supreme Court addressed whether the statute was unconstitutionai under the Georgia and federal constitutions. 6 ' First, the court
determined that the title to the bill, which became the statute, contained
an appropriate reference to the subject matter of the bill. 6 ' Second,
the court addressed the attorney's contention that the statute violated
the equal protection clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions because it applied more restrictive rules for wards who had been
found incompetent by the Department of Veterans Affairs than other
wards.'62 The court applied the "rational basis" standard to test the
statute because no fundamental right or suspect classification was
involved."
The court concluded that the State has a legitimate
interest in protecting VA wards and that the statute was rationally
related to that interest.'
Finally, the court addressed the attorney's

159. Id. at 875-76, 572 S.E.2d at 542-43. Due to an error in the probate court
proceeding, the attorney was originally appointed as the testator's "general guardian"
rather than as his "VA guardian." At the request of the Department of Veterans Affairs,
the initial letters of guardianship were revoked and replaced with letters indicating that
the attorney was serving as a "VA guardian." Id. at 876, 572 S.E.2d at 543.
160. Id. at 876-77, 572 S.E.2d at 543-44.
161. Id. at 876, 572 S.E.2d at 543. The Georgia Constitution prohibits the passage of
a bill "which ... contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof." GA.
CONST. art. III, § 5, para. 3. The court noted that "[tlhe 1996 legislation that contained
what has been codified as § 29-6-11(c) was entitled, 'Guardian and Ward-Guardians'
Compensation and Expenses; Guardianship of Beneficiaries of United States Department
of Veterans Affairs.'" 259 Ga. App. at 876, 572 S.E.2d at 543 (citing 1996 Ga. Laws 1174).
Among the legislation's stated purposes was "'to provide for a comprehensive change in the
guardianship of beneficiaries of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs... and
for other purposes.'" Id.
162. 259 Ga. App. at 877, 572 S.E.2d at 544.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 878, 572 S.E.2d at 544. The court applies the "rational basis test" when no
fundamental right or suspect classification is involved. Id. The court quoted from Craven
v. Lowndes County Hospital Authority, 263 Ga. 657, 659, 437 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1993):
Under [the rational basis] test, the court will uphold the statute if, under any
conceivable set of facts, the classification bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate end of government not prohibited by the Constitution.
Those
challenging the statute bear the responsibility to "convince the court that the
legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not
reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker."
263 Ga. at 659, 437 S.E.2d at 310. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the state had a
legitimate interest in protecting VA wards and that the prohibition of a VA guardian from
taking under the will of a VA ward was a legitimate means by which Georgia could
accomplish this protection. 275 Ga. at 878, 572 S.E.2d at 538. Further, the court
concluded that the statute's underinclusiveness in not protecting all wards in the same way
(in other words, because non-VA wards do not have the same protection under Georgia's
general guardianship law) would not cause the statute to fail under the rational basis test.
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argument that the statute should be limited only to moneys received by
the guardian from the Department of Veterans Affairs over which the
guardian had control.'6 5 The supreme court looked to the wording of
the statute and, finding that wording unambiguous, refused to read any
limitation into the reach of the statute."'

II.

2003 LEGISLATION

In 2003 the Georgia General Assembly enacted only two laws that are
relevant to decedents' estates and trusts.
A.

Presumptionof Death

Prior to the 2003 amendment, Georgia law provided two circumstances
under which an individual who was missing could be deemed dead so
that his estate could be administered. Under O.C.G.A. section 53-9-1(a),
an individual who has been missing for four or more years is presumed
to be dead.' 67 This presumption is rebuttable. 66 Under subsection
(b) of this same Code section, an individual can be proved dead by a
preponderance of the evidence if that individual has been missing for
twelve months or more.' 69 After the tragedy of the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001, it became evident that there are
circumstances in which an individual's death is virtually certain. In
such circumstances, the requirement that the administration of the
individual's estate be suspended for at least one year seems both
unnecessarily harsh and unrealistic. The State of New York responded
to this tragedy by suspending or modifying a number of its rules relating
to the presumption of death and the issuance of death certificates. 7 °
With the 2003 amendment, Georgia law now allows the death of an
individual to be proven "at any time" with "clear and convincing
evidence" if the individual "has been exposed to a specific peril or
tragedy resulting in probable death." 7 '

Id. at 877-78, 572 S.E.2d at 544.
165. 275 Ga. at 878, 572 S.E.2d at 544.
166. Id.
167. O.C.G.A. § 53-9-1(a) (1997 & Supp. 2003).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 53-9-1(b).
170. See Wallace L. Leinheardt, How to Help When Mass Disaster Strikes: The New
York 9/11 Experience, 16 PROB. & PROP. 19 (Sept./Oct. 2002).
171. O.C.G.A. § 53-9-1(d) (2003). Interestingly, New York already had a similar statute
in place at the time of the World Trade Center tragedy. N.Y. Estates, Powers, and Trust
Law § 2-1.7 (McKinney 1998). This statute was applied to a victim of the tragedy in In re
LaFuente, 743 N.Y.S.2d 678 (2002).
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Oral TRusts for Life Insurance

The O.C.G.A. requires all express trusts to be in writing.'72 However, a statute enacted in 2003 allows a limited exception to this rule for
trusts for which the initial corpus is a life insurance policy.173 New
O.C.G.A. section 53-12-22.1 provides that such a trust can be created "by
[an] oral agreement" between the settlor and the trustee that "is
evidenced by one or more contemporaneous ... documents."'74 The
written evidence must include the identities of the settlor, trustee, and
beneficiaries, the nature of the insurance policy, and "[wihether the trust
is revocable or irrevocable."' 75 The trust will terminate within six
months "unless sooner terminated by the settlor."'7 v The purpose of
this limited oral trust is to cover situations in which the settlor has
purchased a life insurance policy and named a trust as beneficiary but
7
has not yet had the opportunity to reduce the trust to writing.
Under the statute, the settlor must reduce the7 8trust to writing within six
months or lose the protection of the statute.

172. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20(a) (1997).
173. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-22.1 (2003).
174. Id. § 53-12-22.1(b).
175. Id. § 53-12-22.1(c).
176. Id.
177. E-mail correspondence dated 5/28/03 and 6/1/03, between author and Rep. Jerry
Keen (R-SH 146), a cosponsor of the bill that resulted in this new statute. On file with
author.
178. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-22.1(c).

